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ABSTRACT: In this article I analyse those that I consider the most powerful counter-
arguments that have been advanced against the non-identity objection to the idea of 
intergenerational harm, according to which an action cannot cause harm to a given 
agent if her biological identity does actually depend—in a partial but still determinant 
way—on the performance of this action. In doing this, I firstly go through the deontologi-
cal criticisms to the person-affecting view of harm, before moving on to sufficientarian 
and communitarian accounts of intergenerational harm. My argument is that neither of 
these theories manage to defuse the non-identity objection. Yet, I conclude by observ-
ing that a possible way out of the non-identity paradox might consist in developing an 
ethical account of intergenerational negative justice that focuses on the functional value 
of the natural and social structures in which humans develop their lives, rather than on 
their instrumental or intrinsic value.
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I
The issue of intergenerational justice has only recently attracted the interest of political and moral philosophers. For millennia we have completely ignored 
the fact that the actions of the living generation might have a negative impact on 
the wellbeing of posterity. This has occurred neither for carelessness nor simply 
because of limited scientific awareness. Humans did not attach importance to 
the fact that they could potentially wrong future people because the harm they 
might cause to their descendants was in actual fact negligible. This continued 
to be so up until the industrialisation of our societies and subsequent intercon-
nection through supranational financial markets. In the last couple of centuries, 
four phenomena have progressively led political and moral theory to broaden 
the discourse on justice and harm, not simply in space but also in time, thus 
creating a new branch of enquiry based on intergenerational social relations: 
the discovery of the irreparable damage that human agency has brought (and is 
bringing) upon the environment, the depletion of non-renewable resources—and 
the correlative inability to come up with technical solutions that can efficiently 
replace non-renewable resources with renewable ones—, the unfair distribution 
of adaptive costs and economic benefits stemming from industrial processes and 
rates of consumption, the creation of huge public debts—through which current 
generations increase their standards of living above their real possibilities while 
leaving the costs to posterity.1
Usually, when applied to traditional intragenerational scenarios, any credible 
account of justice consists both of positive and of negative principles. Positive 
principles of justice pertain to the realm of socio-economic justice and are those 
that impose the duty to undertake actions aimed at improving the condition of 
others—in virtue of the most disparate political justifications as, for example, 
maximizing utility, respecting hypothetical social contracts, letting everybody 
live flourishing lives, helping the most people we can toward sufficiency thresh-
olds, and so on. Negative principles of justice, on the other hand, are those that 
subtend the duty to not cause avoidable harm to others, provided this can be 
averted without incurring unsustainable costs.2
Whether or not we have obligations of socio-economic justice toward poster-
ity is an open issue in political theory. Much depends on whether, and to what 
extent, we can come up with rational justifications for extending intragenerational 
models on the temporal axis.3 In this article I shall leave aside intergenerational 
duties of socio-economic justice, at least in the first part, and I will focus instead 
on the issue of intergenerational harm. In particular, looking at intergenerational 
justice from a negative perspective opens up two further difficulties, one of which 
is easily solvable, while the other is the topic of this article. Firstly, can an agent 
who lives at time t1 be said to cause harm, through one of his actions, to another 
agent who will live at time t2? Secondly, can an agent who lives at time t1 be said 
to cause harm, through one of his actions, to another agent who will live at time 
t2, if the identity of this second agent does partially depend on the performance 
of the action we are examining?
Providing a positive answer to the first question is of paramount importance 
for assessing whether intergenerational harm exists or not. I think we do not need 
many arguments for doing it. Even though we maintain that future people do not 
have rights now, they will surely have rights at the moment of birth—or some 
time after conception—, and it is indisputable that our actions can undermine the 
rights of future people. Assume, for example, that agent A has a picnic in a forest 
without cleaning up after leaving, and that some years later agent B happens to 
walk barefoot on the broken glass left by A and gets hurt. Here there is no doubt 
that A has caused harm to B.4 So at least we can say that there is some margin for 
talking about intergenerational harm. How wide this margin is depends on how 
we respond to the second question.
Consider this further case. Scientists have warned us that if we want to have 
a realistic chance of keeping the global average temperature from exceeding the 
critical limit of 2°C beyond pre-industrial levels—the crucial point beyond which 
the majority of scientists agree that the consequences for both human beings and 
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the environment would start to be severe and irreversible—we should contain 
the total emission of greenhouse gases below one trillion tonnes. It has been cal-
culated that from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day we have 
already emitted more than 600 billion tonnes of CO2 and that we run the very 
serious risk of reaching one trillion before the end of the first half of this century.5 
If these estimates are correct, by keeping unaltered our modes of production and 
of consumption, and hence also our lifestyles, we are going to deliver to future 
people a world in which they will have serious problems of adaptation. Thus, 
future people might try to advance the claim that they have been harmed by our 
actions—or inactions, depending on the perspective.
Nonetheless, differently from the picnic case, here we have the philosophi-
cal complication that the identity of the victims of harm is a variant of the same 
actions—or inactions—that are charged with causing harm. For the biological 
identity of any individual, that is a non-sufficient but necessary component of 
the more general concept of individual identity, is the result of the very empirical 
contingency of which pair of cells match together at the moment of procreation. 
This result clearly depends on which individuals have sexual intercourse and at 
what time. A simple variation in the combination of couples or in the time of pro-
creation would alter the biological identity of their children. Therefore, even if we 
assume that two possible children, conceived by the same couple, would receive 
the same social inputs to the process of creation of their identity, the difference in 
their biological origin—the combination spermatozoon/ovum—should prevent 
us from maintaining that these two possible children are the same person. This is 
the non-identity problem, first formulated by Derek Parfit,6 and later extensively 
discussed in the literature.7
This simple biological argument about non-identity becomes a moral ‘prob-
lem’ in our case of carbon emission because the identity of those people that in the 
future might claim to be harmed by our excessive emissions will owe their iden-
tity—in a non-sufficient but still determinant way—to the fact that our emissions 
have been excessive. For were we to undertake the radical reforms that scientists 
are advocating to remain below the threshold of 2°C beyond the pre-industrial 
era, we would consistently alter the course of our lives, hence we would modify 
the spermatozoon/ovum combinations that we would have in the status quo. 
Accordingly, we would give birth to different people to those who, we imagine, 
might in future blame us for emitting too much CO2. This is so because in order 
to achieve our ecological goal we would have to rethink our economic models, on 
which our location, our jobs, our encounters, what we do during free time, what 
kind of transportation we use, how much money we have, and so on, depend.
It might be objected that radical economic reforms would not necessarily entail 
that two persons deciding to have a child in the status quo scenario would not 
meet and would not take the same decision in the reform scenario. This is true. 
Nevertheless, the chances that they would procreate at the same moment—hence 
providing the same spermatozoon/ovum combination—are so low that in practical 
terms we can consider this occurrence as impossible.8 This last point explains why 
non-identity is a problem for moral philosophers also when discussing reforms 
that are not as radical as those needed to safeguard the planet’s temperature. Just 
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think, for example, of the causal relation that exists between the national saving 
rate of the present generation and the biological identity of future people: the 
choice between expansionary and austerity measures has pervasive effects on 
individual choices of life—hence, also on procreation.
In a few words, the simple but cogent question that the non-identity problem 
poses to those who appeal to intergenerational duties of justice on the basis of a 
normative account of harm is the following: how can we maintain that a given 
person is harmed by a given action, if in the hypothetical case in which that 
given action had not been carried out, that given person would have never been 
born?9 The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I shall defend the 
non-identity argument from the various objections that have been raised against 
it, explaining why they are unsuccessful in bypassing the issue of intergenera-
tional individual rights. In the second part, I shall sketch a brief proposal for a 
philosophical research that might defuse the non-identity objection to the concept 
of intergenerational harm.
II
The non-identity objection to intergenerational harm holds up only insofar as we 
adopt a person-affecting view of harm.10 According to the latter, it can be said that 
I cause you harm through my action A if, as a consequence of this action, I make 
conditions worse for you than they were before I performed A. In other words, to 
establish that harm has been inflicted—and hence also that compensation is due as 
a matter of rights—we need a person to find herself in worse conditions in some 
respects, and more generally we need this person to exist. The philosophical extent 
of such a precondition for harm and compensation might seem negligible as long 
as we cast our analysis on an intragenerational plane, but it becomes determinant 
once we look at the intergenerational consequences of our actions. For if, as the 
proponents of the non-identity problem have rightly—in my view—highlighted, 
by undertaking at time t some radical actions A, B, C aimed at safeguarding the 
wellbeing of people X, Y, W . . . who have not been born yet, but who will live 
at time t1, we do actually alter the identity of the people who will live at t1, so 
that instead of persons X, Y, W . . . there will exist persons Ψ, Ω, Ϊ . . . , we cannot 
hold that our unwillingness to perform now the radical actions A,B,C in favour 
of future people X, Y, W . . . is harming them or will harm them in the future. For 
if we do decide to perform A, B, C, the future people X, Y, W . . . will never exist.
Some authors have sought to circumvent the non-identity problem by shifting 
the focus of harm from individual wellbeing to actions. Both James Woodward 
and Rahul Kumar, for example, have argued that future persons will be in a posi-
tion to say they have been harmed by our actions for the simple reason that our 
actions have violated their ‘legitimate expectations’ to be treated as means rather 
than ends—to put it in a Kantian way—regardless of whether they are better off 
or worse off as a consequence of these actions.11
Kumar, for example, describes the situation in which a drunk driver gets 
very close to killing a pedestrian, but at the very last moment avoids the accident, 
without the pedestrian even having time to be frightened. Kumar argues that even 
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though in this case the pedestrian is not ‘in any way worse-off as a result of his life 
having been put at risk,’ it is undeniable that the pedestrian ‘has been wronged 
by the drunk driver.’12 Whereas, Woodward rattles off many cases against what 
he defines as the ‘no worse-off argument,’13 among which the most powerful one 
is probably the complex promise. Agent X can either promise agent P to carry out 
the actions A and B together, or he can make no promise and perform no action to 
P. The two premises are that X knows that he can perform A but he is unable to 
carry out B, and that P would be better off with A only, rather than with neither A 
nor B. In the end Agent X decides to make the promise of A + B and performs only 
A. Can X be said to make P better off? Woodward maintains that even though X 
increases P’s welfare, X cannot justify his choice on this ground, because ‘there is 
nothing self-evidently absurd or conceptually incoherent about the judgment that 
X’s failure to fulfil his promise completely wrongs P [ . . . ] . Indeed, this possibil-
ity must be allowed for under any moral theory which assigns an independent 
weight to obligations to keep promises.’14
Both authors challenge the person-affecting view, with the admirable aim of 
disentangling the notion of harm from the non-identity trap, or in other words 
of defending a comprehensive account of intergenerational justice that does not 
exclude a discourse on rights and correlative duties. I do not have the chance here 
to dedicate the due attention to their refined arguments, hence I will limit myself 
to explaining why I disagree with the conclusions they draw from their examples.
In the case of Kumar’s driver, I do not think that the driver’s reckless behaviour 
leaves the pedestrian in the same conditions as before they interacted. At least we 
can believe that this episode will lead the pedestrian to reason upon the safety 
of the street he chooses to walk down—or even on the safety of the more general 
action of walking, instead of using public transport, for example—and we have 
reasons to believe that after the escaped accident he would feel less secure than 
before.15 More generally, I would say that it is not so easy to think of a situation 
in which the mere violation of an expectation harms a person ‘without anything 
having happened to her.’16 Yet, assume that a first agent offends the second agent, 
but this second agent does not suffer any loss in his welfare because of the of-
fense. Can we say that this offense is not simply blameworthy but also harmful? 
If the first agent has been deprived of his legitimate expectation to be treated with 
respect, yet such deprivation has no effect on his wellbeing, I would say that the 
offence was not harmful.
In contrast, my response to the Woodward case, that is more complex than 
the previous one, is very simple. Agent X carries out two actions that should be 
analysed separately. He promises P to perform A + B while knowing that he can 
perform only A, and this is surely a wrongful action that harms P. Then he gives 
A to P, and since we know that P is better off with A than without it, we can say 
that this second action benefits P. How we judge the two actions in sequence 
depends on which moral paradigm we adopt. Radical deontologists might say 
that it would have been better if X had given nothing to P if this was the only 
way not to break a promise. On the contrary, utilitarians would compare the loss 
of utility caused by a broken promise to the marginal utility that A has for P. If 
the increase in utility is higher than the loss, they would rank possible scenarios 
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in this way: the best solution is that X gives A to P without promising A + B, the 
second best is that X gives A to P after having promised him A + B, the third best 
is that X gives nothing to P and does not promise anything.
Yet, even if Kumar and Woodward were right in holding that a person can 
be harmed without being made worse off, for the simple fact that his legitimate 
expectations—e.g., to be made promises that are honoured, to be respected, and 
so on—are violated, I cannot see how this would solve the non-identity problem 
at the intergenerational level. Let us imagine that we bite the bullet and accept 
that the drunk driver harms the pedestrian without affecting his wellbeing: how 
can actions A, B, C violate the legitimate expectations of persons X, Y, W if the 
identity of the latter cannot prescind from A, B, C? In other words, X could legiti-
mately make the claim that past generations have been blameworthy for having 
produced energy in a way that unfairly allocated externalities across time. But we 
can imagine that people from previous generations might hypothetically retort 
to X: yes, you are right, we are to blame because by adopting pollutant models of 
production we have failed to treat posterity as ends rather than means, but you are 
wrong in saying that you have been harmed by our blameworthy behaviour—and 
hence also in advancing any hypothetical claim of compensation—because had 
we turned to green economy—that is to say, had it not been for our reproachable 
actions—you would have never existed.
I think the latter is a fundamental crux, because usually those who try to 
dismiss the non-identity problem on deontological grounds make an arbitrary 
inference on the arbitrary effects of actions deriving from their blameworthiness. 
We can disagree with consequentialists and maintain that an agent is to blame for 
committing a given action independently from its consequences, but from this 
first claim, we cannot directly jump to the further claim that this given action, if 
it does not have negative consequences, is also harming someone. My point is 
that the non-identity problem cannot allow us to pass from the first to the second 
claim advocated by intergenerational deontologists like Woodward and Kumar.
Other thinkers have defended the idea that future people can be harmed by a 
past action also when the non-identity conditions occur by relying on an imper-
sonal conception of harm. Some of them have put forward the idea that present 
people are performing actions harmful toward posterity if these actions cause pos-
terity to fall below a minimal subjunctive threshold. Gregory Kavka, for example, 
has proposed the notion of restricted life, ‘a life that is significantly deficient in 
one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and 
worth living’17 as the metric we can use for evaluating the acceptability of social 
conditions throughout time. If action A performed at time t1 “foreseeably”18 causes 
individual X to live a restricted life at time t2, action A is harming individual X. 
The fact that the identity of individual X is partly determined by action A cannot 
lead to different conclusions, in Kavka’s view, because even though X would 
probably egoistically prefer A to have been committed—given that a restricted 
life is still better than no life—, A would remain morally impermissible as long 
as the action violates the impersonal duty of justice to prevent restricted lives.19
A similar argument has been deployed by Edward Page in his sufficientar-
ian account of intergenerational justice. According to Page, ‘earlier generations 
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are bound by a sufficientarian duty to ensure that their successors have access to 
a climate system that is hospitable for decent human livesl.’20 In more practical 
terms, sufficiency would require, in relation to climate change, the reduction of 
CO2 emissions and huge investments for adaptation—quantities and modalities 
should be left to what Page defines as ‘the best scientific evidence.’21 Accordingly, 
within the context of intergenerational sufficientarianism, action A can be said to 
harm agent X if it leads X below the sufficiency threshold, even though A does 
not make X worse off in a diachronic sense.22
Now, keeping aside the evident difficulty in drawing a line between a re-
stricted and a non-restricted life and in specifying what sufficiency is and where 
we should place the threshold,23 and also passing over an articulate discussion 
regarding the opportunity of employing the idea of sufficiency as a bellwether 
for harm rather than in relation to positive duties of justice, I do not believe that 
the sufficientarian interpretation of subjunctive thresholds could be of much help 
in defusing the non-identity objection to intergenerational harm. Even if we buy 
the argument that justice should prevent us from leading others below a subjunc-
tive threshold, there is no doubt that if we leave things unaltered, individuals 
X, Y, W, though living a restricted or insufficient life, will owe their existence to 
our same actions that have led them below the subjunctive threshold. To put my 
argument simply, it is illogical to argue that we have a duty of justice to abstain 
from performing an action that will cause an individual to live below sufficiency 
even when the mere existence of this individual cannot prescind from the per-
formance of this action.
Quite different, because not sufficientarian, but still impersonal, is the solution 
that was initially given to the non-identity problem by the same author who raised 
the paradox, Parfit. He argued that the person-affecting view can be opposed by 
a principle that he calls Q, according to which: ‘if in either of two outcomes the 
same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are 
worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.’24 As 
we can see, the person-affecting view and Q lead to different moral conclusions 
when dealing with outcomes in which people are equal in number but different as 
individuals. For according to Q, we should always opt for the outcome in which 
aggregate welfare is higher, regardless of individual identities. So, for example, 
when reasoning about the actions we might undertake with regards to climate 
change, we ought to choose those actions that will make posterity happier, even 
if this entails different people existing with respect to the status quo.
Nonetheless, the issue becomes trickier when we move from hypothetical 
‘same number choices’ to more realistic ‘different number choices.’ Assume, as an 
example, that a radical reform plan P is expected to lead to the birth of a certain 
number of future people, and that these people will be better off but inferior in 
number to those who would live if we do not execute P. Are we morally justified 
in implementing P? Principle Q is of no use in this choice, hence, if we do not 
want to fall back on the person-affecting view, we have to find a moral theory 
that explains why we ought to carry out P. Parfit calls this theoretical tool theory 
X and he says that it should both solve the non-identity problem and avoid the 
‘repugnant conclusion,’ according to which for any possible scenario in which 
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there are n people living, we can imagine another scenario in which there are nⁿ 
people living in much worse conditions and that we ought to deem it, for aggre-
gative reasons, preferable to the first one, in which there are much fewer people 
who are much better off. Yet Parfit reiterated also more recently that he was ‘not 
sure what (X) should be.’25
However, in his latest contribution to the subject, Parfit maintained that a 
solution to both the non-identity problem and the repugnant conclusion can 
consist in the ‘Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle,’ according to which ‘one of 
two outcomes would be in one way better if this outcome would together benefit 
people more, and in another way better if this outcome would benefit each person 
more.’26 Yet, the difficulty of this solution consists in explaining how we should 
assign priority to either the first part (the ‘collective principle’) or to the second 
part (the ‘individual principle’) of the dual principle, when they enter into conflict.
The same Parfit offers a good practical example. Consider that we had to 
choose between A) ‘One million people will exist at level 1,000’ and B) ‘One 
hundred billion people will exist at level 1.’ The collective component of the dual 
principle would suggest us to opt for B, given that it will maximise aggregate 
welfare over time, but the individual component of the same principle would 
lead us to prefer A, given that in A every member of the group would enjoy a 
good standard of living while in B they would experience a life that is barely 
worth living. Parfit holds that this latter fact (‘the lives of the people in A would 
be roughly a thousand times more worth living’) ‘would do much more to make 
. . . [A] . . . better,’ given that ‘though it matters whether what happens would 
together benefit people more, it matters more whether what happens would 
benefit each person more.’27
Unfortunately, the article in which Parfit was presenting this theory was 
unfinished, and he did not have the chance to further elaborate it. What remains 
unclear is how from the formulation of the ‘Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle’ 
Parfit infers the priority mechanism that he later proposes to regulate the func-
tioning of its two components. Accordingly, it is only by considering the second 
component as superordinate to the first one that we can avoid the repugnant 
conclusion. Yet, we cannot simply take as a given that, from a person-affecting 
prospective, a relatively small aggregate amount of welfare divided among a 
relatively small group of individuals can outweigh almost ad infinitum a relatively 
bigger aggregate amount of welfare divided among a relatively bigger group of 
individuals. Nonetheless, I cannot exclude that this path of philosophical enquire 
opened by Parfit may offer in the future a sound response to the non-identity 
objection, hence for the purposes of this article I leave it as an open possibility.
III
Another promising defensive strategy for intergenerational harm might consist 
in ascribing it to the community rather than to single individuals. Avner de-
Shalit took up this road when he proposed the notion of the ‘transgenerational 
community,’ to which we can—and should—extend our duties of justice. De-
Shalit unravels a refined voluntary model of intergenerational community that 
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is based on moral similarity rather than cultural interaction. Moral similarity is 
firstly achieved among contemporaries, he says, when the dominant ‘norms and 
values,’28 are put under rational scrutiny within the community. Some people 
will oppose them, some others will support them or will eventually decide to 
abandon the community. In the end, the community would need to agree on ‘a 
comprehensive and more or less coherent concept of the good.’29 The norms and 
values that make up this shared concept of the good will form part of the com-
munitarian identity and will extend into the future to the next generations. The 
latter will have to undertake a second process of moral reflection. Are the norms 
and values that permeate the society in which I was born and raised up to the 
historical contingencies I am living? Are they able to keep up with the changes 
in technology, society, politics, and so on? Some people will say yes, some others 
will say no, and a new concept of the good will have to be agreed upon. This is 
how the community keeps in place the constant process of moral reflection on 
itself and preserves moral similarity as generations follow one another.30
De-Shalit uses this idea of moral similarity to call communitarians to extend 
the scope of their theories of justice beyond contemporaries. More specifically, 
he advocates a decreasing model of moral responsibility in which obligations get 
weaker as long as we move from contemporaries to remote descendants, passing 
through the closest ones.31 Although it was not initially proposed in response to 
the non-identity problem, the communitarian argument developed by de-Shalit 
in favour of intergenerational justice could easily be employed as a philosophical 
version of the intuitive objection that many people would raise against Parfit’s 
paradox: I do not care whether specific future individuals can be said to be harmed 
by past actions, because it suffices to maintain that the community as a whole is 
harmed by the blameworthy behaviour of its past members.
Against the argument that this objection presupposes, the counter-objection 
might be raised that it is based on a radical collectivistic methodology, in which 
the individuals making up the community are perfectly interchangeable. Yet, 
the methodological issue could also be raised against the strong individualism 
on which the non-identity problem is based. Therefore, I shall not pursue this 
argumentative line. Rather, I wish to highlight a considerable limit of the commu-
nitarian approach to intergenerational justice. It is firmly anti-cosmopolitan, hence 
incapable of tackling properly the environmental challenges that a comprehensive 
account of intergenerational justice should take into account.
Phenomena like climate change, the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, the rise in the earth’s temperature and so on have local causes but 
global onsets. If we want to properly frame the harm that these environmental 
threats pose to posterity, we should consider posterity as a whole, not as a national 
community. For these threats stem from negative externalities that cross political 
borders. The advantages are usually distributed locally, while the burdens are 
clearly global. Thus, unless we can demonstrate that something like de-Shalit’s 
process of moral similarity occurs at a global level—or in other words, that a global 
community exists—we might have reasons to explain why a current Belgian does 
have moral reasons not to leave the burden of his wellbeing to a future Belgian, 
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but we would not have any argument to justify the extension of this moral duty 
toward a future Jamaican.
The latter point becomes extremely relevant, I believe, when we take into 
consideration the costs of adaptation. Assume, as an example, that some new 
expensive technologies have been discovered for mitigating the effects of violent 
floods due to climate change. The present Belgian could then feel less guilty for 
emitting CO2, given that his children will suffer less from the pollution that he has 
contributed to creating. Yet, this lightening of his moral obligations toward the 
next generation is unjustified, because some other future people living in places 
where the adaptive technology is unavailable—e.g., because it is too expensive—
will pay the price of his dissoluteness. What arguments would communitarians 
have for convincing a present person to take into consideration the effects that 
his action will have on future foreigners? I do not think they would have any.
IV
So far, I have argued that none of the aforementioned philosophical arguments 
are successful in disentangling the rights of future people from the non-identity 
paradox. Yet, a quite alternative way of looking at the harm suffered by future 
generations might consist in emphasising its continuity, or, more precisely, the fact 
that it can be inherited. After all, there is no philosophical dilemma that could deny 
the existence of intragenerational harm, and it may happen that heirs suffer from 
the circumstance that their parents have been inflicted an—intragenerational—loss 
that has not been rectified. If this is true, heirs might demand a compensation in 
virtue of the fact that they were born from people who were worse off than they 
would have been had intragenerational justice been respected. Such a response to 
the non-identity problem has been brilliantly elaborated, for example, by George 
Sher in his discussion on transgenerational compensation.32
Both climate change and public debt might be partially—although never 
completely—included in this scheme of inheritance of injustice. An individual 
raised by a couple who has unjustly paid the costs of adaptation to an impervi-
ous environment, or the price of a debt she has not contracted, is surely worse 
off in comparison with a subjunctive threshold that indicates the hypothetical 
situation in which his parents had not suffered wrongs. Nonetheless, I am not 
sure that this approach might sweep away the non-identity problem when the 
injustice suffered by parents precedes the conception of the child. For we might 
have reasons to believe that had the parents been compensated, a different child 
would have been born—for all the reasons regarding the impact of marginal 
increases of income on individual choices.
The same discourse holds true for historical injustice. As an example, we 
might say that the biological identity of a descendant of slaves cannot be separated 
from the same past slavery. Accordingly, there is no doubt that slavery in itself is 
horrible and morally wrong, and that slaves are victims of a long series of actions 
and practices that are deplorable—so they are worse off than they would be in a 
free world. However, despite the fact that the descendant of slaves is worse off 
than a hypothetical descendant of free ancestors, the latter would be a completely 
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different person from the first one, because slavery is a determinant factor in the 
chain of events within which the reproductive choices of the ancestors are framed.33
Sher explicitly dismisses this conclusion when observing that ‘an obvious 
strategy for avoiding the non-identity problem is to say that where the child of 
an original victim of injustice is concerned, the wrong for which he is owed com-
pensation is not the original one, which was committed before he was conceived, 
but rather some subsequent wrongful failure to compensate for the original wrong 
that takes place after he is conceived.’34 This would amount to saying that the child 
can legitimately demand to be compensated also for an action or social practice 
that—although being wrongful—is one of the preconditions to his existence. Or 
in other words, it would imply that even though it is in the child’s interest that 
the parents be wronged, he can subsequently pretend to be compensated for that 
wrong. I think that such a conclusion would not easily be accepted. It is philosophi-
cally correct to say that the parents are due a compensation, but it does not make 
much sense to say that we can elude the identity causality by simply disentangling 
on the temporal axis the wrongful action from the wrongness of not rectifying it.
Moreover, another problem with inherited injustice is that, as rightly explained 
by Jeremy Waldron, it can happen to be superseded when circumstances change.35 
If, for example, future generations were able to make a radical shift to green and 
renewable resources, the new circumstances would surely reduce the onus of 
compensation from the heirs of over-appropriators of non-renewable resources 
toward the heirs of under-appropriators, in comparison to before the technologi-
cal shift occurred. And, most importantly, even though all my counter-objections 
were misplaced, the harm for which the proponents of inherited injustice demand 
compensation would remain intragenerational harm. What would be inherited is 
only the rectification for an action that was performed in the past. Therefore, this 
solution would only partially rescue the idea of intergenerational harm.
V
Lastly, there remains to respond to the most powerful objection levelled against 
the non-identity scepticism toward intergenerational harm. It might be called the 
over-sensitivity objection and can be spelled out in these terms: from a purely 
analytic point of view, the non-identity problem might be sound, yet the issue of 
biological identity should be kept out of the moral discourse, because if we follow 
this slippery slope we will be obliged to admit that even the most insignificant 
actions—such as drinking a glass of water, tying up shoelaces, and so on—have 
a decisive impact on the identity of future people, hence we would run the risk of 
continuously wondering whether any action we make could be reshuffling future 
identities. Moreover, from this line of reasoning we might also infer what Tremmel 
defines as ‘the ‘butterfly-effect’ argument,’ according to which the concurrence 
of a myriad of different actions—of different magnitude and importance—to the 
identity of future beings cannot allow us to isolate only one action—or one class 
of actions—and assign to it the whole causality.36
Both the over-sensitivity point and the ‘butterfly-effect’ argument are surely 
correct in the description but wrong in the conclusion. For they overlook the 
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important moral difference that exists between the reasons why we undertake 
the various actions that concur to determine future identities. Surely, both the act 
of watching a movie and the act of using the electric bus instead of the scooter 
have the potential of influencing the identity of a future child—by delaying the 
moment in which the sexual intercourse occurs. But while the reason behind the 
first act has nothing to do with the wellbeing of future people—we simply watch 
a movie for the pleasure of doing it—I am here assuming that the second action 
is performed for the purpose of not contributing to make future people worse 
off with respect to the environment. Therefore, while we can remain indifferent 
to the consequences that watching a movie will have on the child’s identity, it 
would be illogical to hold at time t, before deciding to use the electric bus, that 
we are doing it in the interest of the future child that at time t we would have 
expected to be conceived at time t + something, if we know that this same action 
will cause a different child to exist.
In sum, the issue of biological identity is a problem for justification in terms 
of negative justice of all those actions that find their reason in the restraint from 
inflicting harm to posterity. Obviously, the wider the scope of the action, the 
bigger the philosophical problem. If, in the case I was sketching above, there is 
only one child whose identity depends on whether one of his parents takes the 
bus instead of the scooter, and a huge number of other future people that would 
benefit from the green choice of this individual without any effect on their identity, 
when we reason about the drastic political decision that might restrain climate 
change or the increase of national debt, we are dealing with very wide projects 
that will surely have pervasive effects in the composition of next generations. In 
the sense that if we were really to implement on a global scale what scientists are 
recommending us with regard to climate change, we would reshuffle the great 
majority—if not the totality—of future identities.
VI
I have sought to argue so far that the non-identity problem poses an insurmount-
able obstacle to the notion of intergenerational harm. Even if we argue that the 
victim of past harm is the future community as a whole, rather than its single 
components, we would get irremediably stuck in a statist understanding of harm, 
that is unable to take into account the international externalities of phenomena 
like climate change usually posed on the frontline when discussing the possibility 
of causing harm to posterity. Moreover, I have also defended the non-identity 
paradox from the objection that the action that could harm future beings is only 
one of the innumerable components that determine their identity, and I have 
argued that while we can remain indifferent to the non-identity problem in rela-
tion to all those actions that we do not undertake in the interest of future beings, 
we cannot overlook the paradox of doing something in favour of a person who 
owes her existence (partially but still in a determinant way) to the contingency 
that we do not undertake that action.
Yet, it might objected that even though present actions cannot be said to 
harm posterity, they can surely have a negative impact on the environment, and 
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this fact is a moral problem per se, regardless of its consequences on humanity. 
In other words, if we shift our moral obligations from posterity to non-human 
nature, we can condemn our polluting behaviour while remaining indifferent 
about who will exist after us. I do not have the chance here to dwell much on the 
differences between an anthropocentric and a biocentric approach. Roughly speak-
ing, anthropocentrism only recognises instrumental value to the environment—in 
the sense that we care about things like climate change, earth temperature, pol-
lution, and so on, only insofar as these phenomena threaten the healthiness of 
the environment in which humans have to live. Diversely, biocentrism ascribes 
intrinsic value to nature, hence any damage inflicted on the environment is to be 
condemned, even in the hypothetical case in which it does not have any impact 
on human wellbeing.37
It is evident that biocentrism might solve only one part of the problem of 
intergenerational harm, because the whole issue of financial prudence would 
remain untouched. Moreover, even though biocentrism might benefit future 
people, it does not rescue the idea that future human beings can be harmed by 
past actions. Most importantly, without dwelling on the normative validity of the 
claim according to which everything that is ‘alive’ is a unit of moral concern,38 
we can easily appreciate the very practical difficulties that would stem from em-
bracing this principle. If we have serious motivation problems in implementing 
minimal ecological provisions—that is to say, the minimal things needed to keep 
the planet hospitable for humans—, imagine how many chances we would have 
of implementing policies that recognise the intrinsic moral value of a leaf of grass.
Perhaps a less drastic philosophical option could be a sort of sentientism, as 
proposed by Peter Singer, for example.39 In this case, we would include in our 
moral reasoning only those creatures able to experience pain and pleasure. The 
resulting requirement of negative justice would be less demanding than with 
biocentrism. Nonetheless, I am afraid that this account of harm cannot be disen-
tangled from an extended version of the utilitarian doctrine on which not even 
all utilitarians agree, and that would raise the same doubts that characterise ag-
gregative theories in general.40 Lastly, from this prospective how shall we judge 
the lion that kills the gazelle? Can it be blamed for the pain inflicted?
The only way to lead the notion of intergenerational harm out of the non-
identity trap could be probably found in a theory of intergenerational justice that 
shifts the moral focus away from individuals without giving in to the intrinsic 
value of non-human nature. Accordingly, we would not have duties of negative 
justice directly toward specific future people; rather we would be constrained 
in our actions by a duty of financial and environmental carefulness, aimed at 
preserving the integrity of the natural and social structures that allow humans 
develop a ‘flourishing’ life. With natural structures that are indispensable for 
humans to lead a flourishing life I refer to all the abiotic and biotic constituents of 
an ecosystem that, if kept sustainable, provide humans with the resources to fulfil 
their basic needs and to conduct their life in a non-hostile environment.41 With the 
social structures having the same purpose, I refer to those practices, institutions, 
formal and informal norms that determine the distribution of basic wellbeing 
and that contain the gap between different social positions within limits that are 
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sufficient to guarantee individual autonomy.42 From this prospective we would 
not incur the non-identity problem because we would be concerned—function-
ally but not intrinsically—about structures rather than about their users. Does 
such a theory exist?
In discussing the issue of indirect reciprocity that challenges the possibility 
of reaching a social contract agreement between different generations, Stephen 
Gardiner does quickly examine the idea of considering humans as ‘stewards of 
the land’ instead of ‘indirect reciprocators.’43 According to this moral model, in-
dividuals would not be primarily interested in intergenerational fairness, rather 
they would be mainly concerned with the conditions of the environment in which 
the human species lives. Thus, were future generations to inherit an over-polluted 
planet, they would not complain with their grandparents for having been unfairly 
penalised, but they would feel indignant for the fact that humanity as a whole is 
falling short of its obligations toward the earth.
Two things are missing in the theory of the ‘stewards of the land.’ First, why 
should humans consider themselves as bearers of obligations toward the environ-
ment? If the answer is because they ascribe intrinsic value to the earth, we would 
fall back on biocentrism—so we need a different justification. Second, what is the 
method for assigning priorities to the different components of the land? Again, 
if we cannot distinguish between the part of non-human nature that we have an 
obligation to preserve and the part toward which we only have supererogatory 
duties, we end up in the radicalism that is inherent to biocentrism.
In order to respond to these questions, imagine the lodge model. A mountain 
lodge has been realised near the top of a mountain through the funding from a 
rescue association, and it has been left to free use for those who may need it—
mountaineers or climbers just have to bring a sleeping bag and they can spend 
the night there. What are the moral obligations of a guest of this mountain lodge? 
The guest knows that he is not free to act as if he were in his own house insomuch 
as he has to leave the lodge in conditions allowing re-use after a standard tidying 
up—let us call it moral duty H. Yet, the question that interests us here is why the 
guest has duty H. If the guest had to stick to H because he should refrain from 
causing harm to those who will come after, we would implicitly maintain that the 
lodge has a pure instrumental value, hence the lodge model would be of no use 
for us in the non-identity case. If, on the contrary, we hold that the guest has to 
observe H because the lodge is important in itself, regardless of the people who 
will enjoy it, as a sculpture or a piece of art could be, we would be saying that 
the lodge has pure intrinsic value, hence for the case we are examining the lodge 
model would not have any advantage over the biocentric approach.
Accordingly, the lodge model can only suit us if we find a reason why any 
guest has to respect H but only as long as he can reasonably expect that some-
one else will use the lodge afterwards. In other words, we need a reason why in 
the hypothetical situation in which the guest were certain that no other human 
being will use the lodge in the future, H would expire (meaning that we do not 
assign pure intrinsic value to the lodge). One reason, I shall maintain, why the 
guest has moral duty H is that he recognises the functional value of the lodge as 
a shelter structure whose aim is to host people, who would be otherwise exposed 
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to extreme weather conditions. In short, the guest respects the purpose for which 
the rescue association created the lodge, and that we can sum up in the ideal of 
hospitality. But at the same time, the guest knows that the value of the ideal of 
hospitality cannot be dissociated from the existence of one or more indeterminate 
subjects who can receive this hospitality—as, on the contrary, it might be argued 
that the value of artistic beauty is not necessarily dependent on the existence of 
one or more subjects who admire it. Accordingly, the value of the lodge is neither 
purely instrumental because it is expressed in the implementation of an ideal, 
hospitality, that we deem as valuable per se rather than in the marginal increases 
of the wellbeing of the guests (which occur, but are a consequence of the realisa-
tion of the ideal of hospitality), nor is it purely intrinsic given that there can be 
no sense in hospitality without guests. What is intrinsically valuable is the ideal 
of hospitality, and the value of the lodge is functional with respect to the pos-
sibility of hospitality.
My point is that if we look, philosophically, at the sustainability of the envi-
ronment and of the fiscal burden as the minimal conditions for natural and social 
structures to replicate themselves in time, hence we assign them functional value, 
we could obtain a moral theory that safeguards the wellbeing of future people 
without appealing to their individual rights, hence without running into the 
non-identity problem. Following the lodge model, we may hold that although it 
is true that the polluting action A cannot be said to harm agent X if his existence 
depends on the performance of A, it can still be said that A causes harm to the 
ecosystem and that this action is not to be condemned because the ecosystem has 
value per se, but rather because keeping the environment below the threshold 
of irreparable pollution is one of the minimal conditions for natural and social 
structures to last. However, there would remain to explain why I am taking as 
given that there is something valuable in the fact that society can replicate itself 
in the future, as in the lodge case I postulated there was something valuable per 
se in hospitality. Again, if natural and social structures were valuable only for 
the consequences they have on individuals, we would fall back into the grips of 
the non-identity trap.
One possible answer is that safeguarding the basic functioning of natural and 
social structures is important per se, independently of the identity of the persons 
that will inhabit them, so far as it is an indispensable prerequisite for the realization 
of an impersonal ideal, as for example a relational account of socio-economic jus-
tice. Thus, the functional value of both the environment and fiscal stability might 
consist in the fact that they allow for an equal distribution of wellbeing. Think 
for example of climate change and about the circumstance that those individu-
als who are more vulnerable to it, because of either their geographical or social 
positions, risk to carry the heaviest burden.44 The same discourse holds true for 
public debt so long as it worsens the life opportunities of some individuals from 
one municipality with respect to other municipalities, or of a region in relation 
to other regions or of a state in comparison with other states—depending on 
whether we are talking of local or national debts.
Let us suppose, in fact, that at time t we live in a society that is troubled by 
both excessive emissions and deficit expenditures, whose negative consequences 
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are likely to be suffered by future generations. We have two options, either we 
preserve the status quo, so that individuals X, Y, W will be born, or we adopt 
reformative actions thus leading to the conception of Ψ, Ω, Ϊ. In the first case, we 
can assume that our dissipation will increase inequality, either within the group X-
Y-W or between this group and other individuals, given that some costs will have 
to be paid and the most vulnerable individuals will be most affected. Whereas, in 
the second scenario we can maintain that natural and social structures capable of 
containing inequalities will be transferred to Ψ, Ω, Ϊ. If we believe that equality 
is valuable per se,45 we can recognize the functional value of natural and social 
structures and prefer the second scenario to the first one, notwithstanding that 
different individuals will be conceived. The limit of this argumentative strategy 
is that those who might adopt it would have to bite the bullet and accept that in 
the first scenario X, Y, W could not have claimed to be harmed by the inaction of 
their forefathers, hence by undertaking reformative actions we would reshuffle 
individual identities without the justification of saving someone damage, but 
rather only for the sake of equality.
A second possible answer to the question why natural and social structures 
have functional value is to say that they are important for ‘securing justice,’ rather 
than implementing a specific principle of justice. This is, for example, the reading 
that David Heyd proposes of Rawls’s just saving principle.46 According to the lat-
ter, saving is required between generations only for the purpose of ‘preserv[ing] a 
just basic structure over time,’ and when this has been guaranteed ‘net real saving 
may fall to zero.’47 Heyd maintains that Rawls is defending an intergenerational 
moral duty to preserve a social system that can promote political duties of justice 
among contemporaries. In Heyd’s own words, ‘maintaining a system of justice 
is arguably a desirable goal for human beings, a social good, even an intrinsic 
value.’48 In this sense, the duty to fulfill the conditions for justice is superordinate 
to the various principles in which justice can be explicated (as for example the 
principle of equality we were considering above as intrinsically valuable).
In tune with this interpretation of the idea of just saving, we might hold 
that even though reformative actions at time t will cause different individuals to 
exist at time t1, these actions cannot be avoided as long as they are necessary to 
safeguard the basic conditions of justice over time. Even in this case, we would 
have to bite the bullet and accept that X, Y, W would not have been wronged in 
the status quo scenario, yet we prefer a world inhabited by n individuals having 
the institutional resources to realise their ideal of justice rather than a world in 
which these basic conditions are missing, because justice is valuable per se.
Both solutions have the potential to offer a theoretical foundation to the 
functional value of natural and social structure, which in turn can explain why 
the present generation ought to act in the interest of future beings even when 
this would change the identity of these individuals—in comparison to the status 
quo alternative. The advantage of a moral argument based on the intrinsic value 
of a relation, as equality, over a theoretical solution to the non-identity problem 
that looks at absolutes, as the sufficientarian arguments proposed by either Ka-
vka or Page, is that it is disentangled from the identity of the persons to whom 
the distributive principle we consider as intrinsically valuable is addressed. As 
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argued before, if equality is valuable per se, we can justify a series of actions that 
constitute the minimum requirement to preserve equality over time, also when 
these actions will alter the identity of the individuals that we expect to stand in a 
relation of equality in the future. Conversely, if we maintain that having enough 
of some goods or resources is intrinsically valuable, we cannot prescind from the 
identity of the persons who are supposed to have enough of something, and above 
all we cannot ignore that having a set of resources that is higher than zero but 
less than enough is better than having nothing at all. If at time t we could either 
abstain from carrying out action A thus making X exist in a world in which he 
will be below sufficiency, or carry out action A which will make Ψ exist above 
sufficiency, the same ideal of sufficiency cannot justify the non-existence of X. In 
the same way that if X was an individual who is structurally under sufficiency 
because of a serious handicap (whose negative consequences cannot be neutralized 
through economic means) we cannot maintain—from a sufficientarian perspec-
tive—that whether he continues to live or instead passes away is irrelevant from 
the point of view of an aggregate calculation of well-being—thus implying that 
his life under sufficiency is worth nothing.
On the other hand, the advantage of an approach that addresses the temporal 
sustainability of the minimum conditions for justice, rather than for a specific 
relational principle, is that it does not require prior adherence to a given concep-
tion of justice. However, the limit is that the scope of this theoretical tool is quite 
limited, since it is not always a given to prove that some actions or some practices 
might endanger justice tout court, meaning the functioning of the basic institutions 
that can implement a just distribution of burdens and benefits of social coopera-
tion—regardless of what we consider as just. Accordingly, we might have to admit 
that a given action A, as for example polluting a river, which is morally wrongful 
on an intragenerational level, does not cause an intergenerational harm as long 
as future individuals could have a reasonable opportunity to secure justice, in 
spite of this action.
This is just a modest proposal for a research agenda that I wished to make at 
the end of the article, also to stress that although I believe the non-identity objection 
to intergenerational justice is much stronger than it is usually thought to be, it is 
not inescapable. To do it, we just need more philosophical work. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that both the first and the second solutions to the non-identity 
problem (respectively based on telic equality and securing justice) should not be 
confused with theories of intergenerational socio-economic justice, which I have 
left aside in this article. Accordingly, my attempt has been to read the notion of 
intergenerational harm in relation to the chances future people will have either 
to realise a relational ideal of justice or to secure justice tout court, two things 
that I have assumed to be intrinsically valuable. From this derives the functional 
value of both natural and social structures. The final argument is that a useful 
and so far quite unexplored philosophical path that might possibly lead us out 
of the non-identity trap, and that would require further theoretical elaboration, 
consists in explaining why a given action A that is carried out at time t can be said 
to violate a negative duty of justice for the ‘mere’ reason that it creates obstacles 
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to the reproduction of natural and social structures. And I have explored the 
possibility that it might be so in virtue of the functional value of these structures.
CONCLUSION
I have defended the non-identity objection to intergenerational harm from the 
scepticism that has been levelled against this argument by those maintaining that 
it makes sense to say that a person has been harmed by an action even when she 
partially owes her existence to the performance of this action. I have argued that if 
we take the issue of biological identity seriously, we cannot condemn the financial 
and environmental dissoluteness of contemporaries by appealing to the individual 
rights of posterity. This is not to say that future people cannot have rights, quite 
the opposite. Even if we maintain that future people do not have rights now, they 
will surely have rights at the moment of conception or soon after. Furthermore, 
it is indisputable that an action performed at time t can jeopardise the individual 
right of a person who will be conceived at time t1. I have offered the example of 
the picnic case and the abandoned glass, but we might make many others.
My point is simply that when advocating pervasive economic and social 
reforms in the name of the right of posterity to have the chance of living a decent 
life, we cannot overlook that, by changing our models of production and by 
radically altering our public debt policies, we will give birth to different future 
individuals to those whose rights we wanted to safeguard at the very beginning. 
And I have sought to argue why all the counter-objections that have been made 
against the non-identity paradox within the grounds of individual rights have 
failed to deliver a coherent defence of intergenerational justice.
Lastly, far from surrendering to the non-identity objection, I have maintained 
that a way out of this theoretical trap probably exists, and it should be looked for 
neither in aggregative doctrines nor in purely biocentric ethics. Rather, the norma-
tive focus should be directed toward the natural and social structures that allow 
the human life to replicate itself in the future and to their functional value. Only 
in this way we can defend what we might expect humans to need throughout 
subsequent generations without incurring the theoretical problem of explaining 
who these humans are.
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